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Abstract 
By conducting panel data analysis across 32 federal entities 
in Mexico over the period 1994-2006, this paper studies the 
determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) and its effect 
on income inequality within and between regions. We observe 
that the level of development and the size of the market have a 
direct relationship with FDI and therefore, they tend to increa-
se the inequality gap between regions, but there is no evidence 
suggesting that it creates inequality within them. 
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Inversión extranjera en México. Determinantes y su efecto en la desigualdad 
del ingreso
 
Resumen
A través de un análisis de datos en panel para 32 entidades federales en México durante el 
periodo de 1994 a 2006, este trabajo explora las determinantes de la inversión extranjera 
directa (IED) y su efecto sobre la desigualdad del ingreso dentro y entre las regiones. Se 
observa que el nivel de desarrollo y el tamaño de mercado tienen una relación directa con 
la IED; por lo tanto, tienden a acrecentar la brecha de desigualdad entre las regiones, pero 
no existe evidencia que sugiera que la IED genera desigualdad dentro de las regiones.
Palabras clave: inversión extranjera directa, determinantes, desigualdad del ingreso, panel 
de datos, crecimiento económico.
Introduction
The theoretical and empirical arguments on the determinants of foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) in the relevant literature, are diverse and in some cases controver-
sial. Beginning with the Ricardian two-factor model, which establishes that inter-
national exchange is given by the existence of comparative advantages between 
countries, it means that labor abundant countries most import capital, and capital 
abundant countries most import labor, based on the suggestion of Stopler-Samuel-
son neoclassical model that states that market openness increases the use of low 
cost, an abundant factor in developing countries, as exports and imports adjust 
according to the orthodox principle of comparative advantages. Hence, according 
to standard theory, an important determinant of FDI in developing countries is the 
low-cost labor and foreign investment has a distributional effect on the economy 
(Ghosh, 2003; Lee and Vivarelli, 2006). In this sense, less developed countries 
have a comparative advantage on labor and so their exchange pattern bases on 
wages, they are able to attract FDI from developed countries due to lower wages.   
Moreover, foreign investment is expected to flow towards the production of trada-
ble goods that mainly uses the cheaper and abundant factor of the economy, while 
the costly and scarce factor is less used. This mechanism increases the income 
of the factor which is relatively most used in the export sector and is also most 
abundant, this factor is conventionally assumed to be unskilled labor in developing 
countries; by the same token, income distribution is expected to improve and even-
tually both countries benefit.Foreign direct investment in Mexico. Determinants and its effect on income inequality
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Orthodox theory has found empirical support to the extent that the surge of mar-
ket-oriented policies, implemented worldwide since the 1980s, has encouraged the 
FDI flow from developed to developing countries and one of the main reasons is 
the comparative advantage in terms of lower wages in the host countries (UNCTD, 
1998). There is also empirical evidence that wages have increased in the regions 
where FDI has concentrated. On the other hand, although corporations can move to 
low-cost labor countries, they do not tend to move to less developed regions within 
a specific country (Redding and Venables, 2004; Ma, 2006), and in some cases 
they seek for qualified labor in relative terms (Fenestra and Hanson, 1997; Lipsey 
and Sjöholm, 2004), especially if the production process involved has skill-biased 
technology, relative to the traditional local production. This trend consequently 
can increase the income gap within and between regions in the host country and 
therefore, challenges orthodox assumptions.
Since FDI is a form of international exchange in which the main actors are Multina-
tional Corporations (MNC), we have to remember that an enterprise’s main goal is 
to increase earnings  so they will select locations which facilitate the achievement 
of this (Kaya and Walker, 2009). Considering that MNC think of FDI as an exchan-
ge facilitator, alternative theories suggest additional determinants of FDI. For ins-
tance, the eclectic theory, evolved by Dunning (1980, 2001), integrates three inte-
rrelated concepts to evaluate the factors influencing and determining cross-border 
production. In its general form, the theory is also known as the OLI paradigm due 
to the three main concepts it involves, which are explained as follows:
(O) Ownership advantages, are firm specific characteristics, such as technology, 
brand name or economies of scale, that can be transferred between countries wi-
thin the multinational enterprise and, they facilitate higher revenues and/or lower 
costs that offset the cost of operating in a foreign country, they also provide market 
position and operational advantages over other firms. 
(L) Location advantages or country specific advantages, are important to deter-
mine the host country or the region within it, they should guarantee an efficient 
and profitable operation of the firm; they can be separated in two groups: The 
first group comprises economic and geographical features, which are related to 
quantity, quality and cost of, and access to, production factors, market size, access 
to skilled labour, distance to major markets or to the home country, and access to 
infrastructure, transport and communications. The second group involves political Carmen Guadalupe Juárez Rivera y Gerardo Ángeles Castro 
204 Contaduría y Administración 58 (4), octubre-diciembre 2013: 201-222
advantages, such as the legislation that affects the FDI regime, trade and interna-
tional production. 
(I) Internalization advantages comprise the options that the firm has to operate 
directly or indirectly in a host country, for instance, the firm can own the facilities 
or alternatively can licence its specific advantages to another firm, create subsi-
diaries abroad, enter a joint venture with another company, form alliances or sell 
franchises; in any case, the firm will have to, first, study the effect of the option that 
guarantees more benefit and less risk.
Dunning (1990) also states that FDI benefits host countries in the next five lines: 1) 
by enterprise efficient productivity while diminishing management costs or increa-
sing returns from labor and/or capital; 2) trough innovation, quality improvement, 
or managerial estructures; 3) trough relocating production resources according to 
comparative advantages; 4) by accesing new foreign markets and 5) diminishing 
costs by changes on demand and supply.
On the other hand, with the pass of time, market distortions have been decreasing 
thanks to government’s recognition of their impossibility to satisfy the demand of 
investment necessary for economic growth and development.  Endogenous eco-
nomic growth theory (Mattos, 2002), supposes that long term growth depends on 
the country capacity to accumulate capital, human capital and knowledge, that is 
the reason why governments should plan and define the accumulation level of this 
factors according to growth expectancies. Countries have been designing policies 
to stimulate private investment attraction in which  FDI is included (Ros, 2004).
To conclude, orthodox theories suppose that using comparative advantages less-de-
veloped countries will increase their labor demand by attracting FDI due to cheap 
labor costs, MNC which are capital owners have to define their locations with the 
object of increasing earnings which can be possible if they establish in less deve-
loped countries with low wages. Then, scarce capital countries should attract FDI 
trough openness policies that will suit endogenous economic growth.
The certainty of this depends on the interest of MNC; in order to explain this we 
give Kojima (1973) and Markusen (1999) classifications for FDI. Kojima divides 
FDI basically in two types: the one that promotes trade, “trade – oriented” and the 
other one that inhibits trade:  “not-trade-oriented”.Foreign direct investment in Mexico. Determinants and its effect on income inequality
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Under this assumption, trade-oriented FDI is the kind that seeks resources ac-
cording to comparative advantages, it means that a country looks for a location 
to compensate for its lack of resources or labor; under this context FDI helps to 
build an export structure which positively contributes to international trade. On the 
opposite, there is the not-trade-oriented FDI. This kind tries to avoid trade barriers 
(qualitative and quantitative) to get a costs reduction, it looks for locations to in-
crease the enterprise´s market, it does contribute to import substitution, so it does 
inhibit international exchange.
Markusen and Maskus (1999), by use of the basic FDI classification of“vertical 
kind” and “horizontal kind”,  developed the “capital – knowledge kind”.  Defini-
tions are as follows:
Vertical FDI is represented by firms whose production processes have been divi-
ded and located in different geographical regions according to comparative advan-
tages.  Under a vertical FDI model, multinational activity is defined by differences 
in countries factor endowments, this type will be relevant only when countries get 
different endowments and it helps for international exchange.
Horizontal FDI consists of multiple  plant firms which strictly replicate their pro-
duction process in every location they have.  In this case, the firm is looking to 
supply the host country market. This type of FDI will be relevant only in similar 
countries, otherwise just one of them will benefit either from market size or from 
the difference on costs factors.
Capital-Knowledge FDI conjugates the two concepts above. In other words, it 
allows multinational corporations to have multiple plants and to divide geographi-
cally the production process.  The capital–knowledge FDI model has two impor-
tant assumptions: first, that knowledge can move internationally and second, the 
existence of multiproduction facilities. Under this model, FDI will be relevant in 
either similar countries or countries with different endowments. This type of FDI 
satisfies the needs of  costs factors and those of bigger markets, it also provides the 
host country the opportunity to attract horizontal and vertical FDI.
This study is aimed at testing the significance of the economic and geographical 
specific advantages, as determinants of FDI across 32 local states in Mexico, over 
the 1994-2006 period; we do not include political determinants, as the relevant 
Mexican legislation is a region-invariant variable.Carmen Guadalupe Juárez Rivera y Gerardo Ángeles Castro 
206 Contaduría y Administración 58 (4), octubre-diciembre 2013: 201-222
If we assume that FDI brings with it economic benefits and, according to the OLI 
paradigm, agglomeration or level of development, in terms of infrastructure, hu-
man capital, market size, etc., are positively related to the inflow of FDI, we can 
infer that FDI will create inequality across regions, and can have diverse effects 
within regions. In this respect, this paper is also aimed at testing the effect of FDI 
on inequality within and between 32 local states in Mexico. The period of the 
study commences in 1994 because the current methodology to measure FDI across 
regions in Mexico started that year. This period is relevant because it incorporates 
the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) era, that became effective also 
in 1994. The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we explain the variables, 
in section 3, the econometric analysis is conducted, and section 4 is the conclusion 
of the paper and it outlines policy.    
The data
For this study, we constructed a balanced panel consisting of 224 observations, 
across 32 federal entities in Mexico, over 7 time observations, every two years, 
between 1994 and 2006. The analysis includes 5 sets of explanatory variables to 
study if economic and geographical advantages, across Mexican regions, are signi-
ficant determinants of FDI and, to study their effect on income inequality.
The first set comprises income level variables, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
per capita and average wage in real terms, the source is Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística Geografia e Informática (INEGI, 2011) and Comisión Nacional de Sa-
larios Mínimos (CONASAMI, 2011), respectively. The second set contains market 
size variables, GDP in real terms and population, the source is INEGI (2011) and 
Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO, 2011). In the third set we include va-
riables to measure human capital or specialization, they are per capita government 
expenditure on education (INEGI, 2011) and educational attainment, the source is 
Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP, 2011). The fourth set comprises variables 
that represent infrastructure; they are government expenditure on transport and 
communications per capita (INEGI, 2011a), and per capita landline telephones 
(INEGI, 2011). The fifth and last set contains 2 geographical location variables in 
relation to major markets. The first variable is constructed by taking the distance 
between the capital of the local state and Mexico City (the major market in the 
country), and it is aimed at testing if FDI is market seeking or horizontal. The 
second variable takes the distance between the capital of the local state and the Foreign direct investment in Mexico. Determinants and its effect on income inequality
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closest official crossing point at the borderline with the US, and is aimed at tes-
ting if FDI is vertical or production cost-minimizing, the source is Geobytes, Inc. 
(2011)1. Our dependent variable is FDI (INEGI, 2011); it is also incorporated as an 
explanatory variable in the inequality models. The explanatory variables are also 
included in the inequality models. All the per capita variables are constructed with 
population data from CONAPO (2011). 
The dependant variable on income inequality within regions is the GINI coeffi-
cient; it is constructed with micro level data from household income surveys pro-
vided by (INEGI, 1994-2006). The dependent variable on inequality between re-
gions is defined as follows.
    
where I is the index on income inequality between regions, i is the local state, t 
is the time period, yit is the log of per capita GDP for every local state in the time 
period t, yDFt is the log of per capita GDP for Mexico City at the time t. The va-
riable is expressed in positive values because it takes the region with the highest 
GDP per capita (Mexico City) as reference. This has been used before as an index 
of inequality between countries by Chatterji (1992), and as an index of inequality 
between Mexican regions by Rodríguez-Oreggia and Costa-i-Font (2002).
The econometric model
In this section we conduct three different sets of regressions. The first set is aimed 
at testing the determinants of FDI. In the second and third sets studies the effect of 
FDI and its determinants on income inequality within and between regions respec-
tively. All the regressions are performed in logs, in order to obtain elasticities and 
to be able to conduct homogeneous interpretations of the effects of the explanatory 
variables. Every equation is performed through five different specifications, ordi-
nary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE) with group dummy variables, FE with 
 1Shatz and Venables (2000) argue that firms make investments in a foreign country due to 2 main reasons. The 
first one is to economize on tariffs and transports cost in order to better serve the local market; this type of FDI 
tends to locate within or close to local major markets and is called horizontal or market seeking. The second one 
is to reduce the cost of production factors to supply the production process with lower-cost inputs, in order to 
increase profits; this type of FDI tends to locate in low-cost labor regions or countries, close to the source coun-
try, and is called vertical or production cost-minimizing. In this study we consider the US as the source country 
because between 2000 and 2006 it provided about 96 percent of the FDI inflow to Mexico (INEGI, 2011).   Carmen Guadalupe Juárez Rivera y Gerardo Ángeles Castro 
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group and time dummy variables, random effects (RE) with cross-section error 
component and, RE with cross-section and time error components. 
In order to select the appropriate specification, three different tests are carried out. 
The F test examines if data are poolable, that is, if groups or time periods have the 
same constant; alternatively it studies if the group dummy variables or the time 
dummy variables are statistically significant when they are added to the pooled 
regression in order to turn to FE models. The null hypothesis of the F test across 
groups is H0: αi = α, the null hypothesis over time is H0: αt = α, we also combine 
both null hypothesis when both group and time dummy variables are added to the 
OLS equation. The F test can also be performed to compare different specifica-
tions, for instance, group and period effects versus group effects. In any case, if 
the null hypothesis is rejected, the unrestricted regression is appropriate. To test 
for the presence of random effects we use the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange Mul-
tiplier (LM) test (1980) based on the OLS residuals, if the null hypothesis H0: σ2
u 
=0 is true, that is, there are no random effects (individual-specific or time series 
error variance are cero) and therefore the classical (pooled) regression model with 
a single constant (α i = α) is appropriate, then the LM statistic has a distribution 
that is chi-squared with one degree of freedom. The Hausman test (1978) com-
pares the coefficient estimates from the RE model to those from the FE model, the 
idea underlying the test is that both the RE and the FE estimators are consistent if 
there is no correlation between the individual or period error components and the 
explanatory variables xkit and, therefore, they should not differ systematically. On 
the other hand, if the unobservable error components are correlated with any xkit, 
the RE estimator is inconsistent, while the FE estimator remains consistent. The 
test statistic has and asymptotic chi-squared distribution, if the null hypothesis H0: 
the two estimates should not differ systematically is rejected, the RE estimator is 
inconsistent and the FE model is preferred.  
Determinants of FDI
Table 1 presents the regression of FDI on its determinants. When we conduct the 
F test to compare the group and period effects specifications to the group effects 
equations, the results show that the restricted regressions are appropriate at the 5 
percent level of significance. In contrast, the F test rejects the null hypothesis when 
comparing the group effects equations versus the OLS regressions. This outcome 
suggests that the FDI functions change across groups but do not change much over 
time. The LM test rejects the null hypothesis in any case at the 5 percent level of Foreign direct investment in Mexico. Determinants and its effect on income inequality
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significance, and therefore suggests the presence of random effects. The Haus-
man test on the group effects equations shows different results. In the regressions 
on GDP per capita, GDP, population and per capita government expenditure on 
education the random effect specification is preferred, while in the regressions 
on average wage, educational attainment, per capita government expenditure on 
transport and communications, and per capita landline telephones, the fixed effect 
specification is appropriated. As the distance variables are time-invariant, when 
we conduct the regressions on these variables only the OLS equations and the 
RE specifications with group effects are performed; the regression with the FE 
specification are not carried out because the coefficients of any variable with a 
within-standard deviation of zero are not well identified under this specification.
The regressions presented in table 1 yield the following results: From the variables 
on income, FDI per capita is highly elastic to the GDP per capita; 1 percent increa-
se in the average income leads to a 3.84 percent up turn on the dependent variable, 
whereas the coefficient on the average wage is positive although not significant. 
The coefficients on the market size variables are both positive and significant; an 
upturn of 1 percent on GDP or population raises the FDI indicator by 2.04 percent 
and 1.29 percent respectively. In terms of human capital formation we observe that 
the per capita of government expenditure on education is positive but not signifi-
cant, the educational attainment variable is positive and significant and it has the 
most elastic effect on the dependent variable; an increase of 1 percent on this va-
riable raises FDI by 6.72 percent. As for the infrastructure variables, the per capita 
of government expenditure on transport and communications and the per capita 
of landline telephones are both positive but only the latter is significant, 1 percent 
increase in the per capita of landline telephones leads to a 1.21 percent upturn on 
the dependent variable. 
Finally, the geographical location variables are both negative, the variable on the 
distance to Mexico City is significant only in the OLS model, while the variable on 
the distance to the US border is significant in both the random effects and the OLS 
models, at one percent reduction in the distance to the US border FDI increases by 
2.09 percent.Carmen Guadalupe Juárez Rivera y Gerardo Ángeles Castro 
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Table 1
Determinants of foreign direct investment
Notes: The dependent variable is FDI per capita, p values in parenthesis, all the variables are 
expressed in logsForeign direct investment in Mexico. Determinants and its effect on income inequality
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In order to test the robustness of the explanatory variables we conduct regressions 
that include the most significant determinants of FDI from the five sets of geogra-
phical and economic variables. Except for the market size set, we take population, 
which is less significant than GDP, to avoid multicollinearity between GDP and 
GDP per capita. The first regressions, presented in table 2, do not include the ti-
me-invariant variables (distance to the US border and distance to Mexico City), so 
that we can perform the five different specifications, as before. 
Table 2
Determinants of foreign direct investment (multi-variable equations)
Notes: The dependent variable is FDI per capita, p values in parenthesis, all the variables are 
expressed in logs
The LM test is unable to reject the null hypothesis H0: σ2
u = 0 in both specifications 
with group effects and group and period effects and therefore, the classical (pooled) 
regression model with a single constant (α i = α) is appropriate. In addition, the F test 
does not to reject the null hypothesis H0: the unrestricted regression is appropriate, at 
the five per cent level of significance, when comparing equations 2 and 3 versus 1. 
Consequently, the OLS specification is the most convenient in this case. 
From table 2 we observe that GDP per capita, population and per capita landline 
telephones are positive and statistically significant and, they have an elastic effect 
on FDI. Only the educational attainment variable is not significant at any con-
ventional level. This result suggests that the effect of education on FDI is rather 
created through the level of development in a region, represented in this equation 
by GDP per capita or infrastructure (per capita landline telephones), as education 
is strongly associated to these variables. Carmen Guadalupe Juárez Rivera y Gerardo Ángeles Castro 
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Table 3
Determinants of foreign direct investment
(OLS multi-variable equation, including time-invariant variables)
Notes: The dependent variable is FDI per capita, p values in parenthesis, all the variables are 
expressed in logs
Taking into account that the preferred equation in table 2 is the OLS specification, 
we add to this equation the geographical location variables. The results are repor-
ted in table 3. We did not incorporate these time-invariant variables in the previous 
exercise, which compares five different specifications, because their coefficients, 
with a standard deviation of zero, are not well identified under the FE specification, 
as commented before. Foreign direct investment in Mexico. Determinants and its effect on income inequality
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The results in table 3 are similar to those reported in the OLS specification in table 
2. The GDP per capita, population and the per capita of landline telephones varia-
bles are positive and significant and they have an elastic effect on FDI. We can also 
see that the magnitude of the coefficients do not differ much in both equations. As 
for the geographical location variables, only distance to the US border is negative 
and significant, and it confirms that from the two geographical location variables, 
distance to the US is more robust, as shown in table 1.     
The effect of FDI on income inequality within regions
In this section we first studied the effect of FDI on income inequality within re-
gions, excluding control variable. The results, reported in Panel 1 of table 4, indi-
cate that FDI investment does not have a significant effect on the Gini coefficients2 
of the federal entities in any of the five specifications.
The regressions reported in Panel 2 include the determinants of FDI that were used 
in table 2. These control variables are incorporated in the equation to isolate the 
effect of FDI. The geographical location variables are not added in this exercise for 
the previously explained reason. 
According to the LM test, the classical (pooled) regression model with a single 
constant (α i = α) is appropriate, because the test is unable to reject the null hy-
pothesis H0: σ2
u = 0 in both specifications with group effects and group and period 
effects. Furthermore, when comparing equations 2 and 3 versus 1, the F test does 
not reject the null hypothesis H0: the unrestricted regression is appropriate, at the 
five per cent level of significance and hence, the OLS specification is the preferred 
equation. 
2Calculated Gini Coefficients are given in appendix 1.Carmen Guadalupe Juárez Rivera y Gerardo Ángeles Castro 
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Table 4
The effect of FDI on the Gini coefficient  
(single-variable and multi-variable equations)
Notes: The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient, p values in parenthesis, all the variables are 
expressed in logs
FDI remains non significant. The population variable is positive and significant, 
which indicates that the larger the population is within a federal entity, the more 
unequal the federal entity tends to be. The per capita of landline telephones varia-
ble is negative and significant; this result suggests that infrastructure contributes 
to improve income distribution within regions. GDP per capita and educational 
attainment do not have explanatory power in this exercise.   
Table 5 shows the OLS specification including geographical location variables. As 
in the regressions in table 2, the time-invariant variables were not incorporated in 
the equations in table 4, because their coefficients have a standard deviation of zero 
and are not well identified under the FE specification. Foreign direct investment in Mexico. Determinants and its effect on income inequality
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Table 5
The effect of FDI on the Gini coefficient
(OLS multi-variable equation, including time-invariant variables)
Notes: The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient, p values in parenthesis, all the variables are 
expressed in logs.
The results reported in table 5 do not differ much from those reported in the OLS 
specification in Panel 2 of table 4. The GDP per capita and FDI variables remain 
non significant. The population and per- capita- landline- telephones variables re-
main significant, keep the same sign and the magnitude of the coefficients is simi-
lar in both equations. It is worth noting that the variable on education is now posi-
tive and significant at the 10- per- cent level, which suggests that as the population, 
in average, gets more educated, income dispersion tends to increase. From the 
two geographical location variables, distance to the US is positive and is the only 
significant; this result implies that the closer the federal entities are to the northern 
borderline the more unequal they tend to be.Carmen Guadalupe Juárez Rivera y Gerardo Ángeles Castro 
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The effect of FDI on income inequality between regions
Firstly we conduct regression upon five different specifications, excluding control 
variables, to test the effect of FDI on income dispersion between regions. The out-
come is reported in Panel 1 of table 6. The F test rejects the null hypothesis, H0: the 
unrestricted regression is appropriate, in the three cases and, therefore, it indicates 
that it is convenient to include time and group effects in the model. Moreover, 
the LM test rejects the hypothesis that individual-specific and time series error 
variance are cero, which suggests that we need to turn to panel data models. After 
comparing the coefficient estimates from the RE model to those from the FE model 
by applying the Hausman test, we observe that the FE model is more convenient 
in both group effects and group and period effects specifications. Hence, the FE 
model with group and period effects is more appropriate from the five regressions. 
In this case, it is possible to see that the FDI variable is positive and significant at 
the 10 per cent level, in other words, FDI is associated to income dispersion across 
regions.     
In the second panel we incorporate the control variables used previously, except 
the geographical location variables, because their coefficients are not well iden-
tified in the FE model. As in Panel 1, in this case the FE model with group and 
period effects is the preferred specification. The four control variables are signi-
ficant; population, educational attainment and landline telephones have positive 
sign, while GDP per capita has negative coefficient. This result implies that infras-
tructure and education are not well distributed across regions because they tend to 
create inequality between them; in addition, the larger the population is the more 
unequal is the distribution of income across federal entities. On the other hand, 
the result suggests that the growth of GDP per capita has a redistributive impact 
on income across regions. It should be added that FDI is no longer significant in 
Panel 2. To this respect, we can say that the distribution of income across regions 
in Mexico is not directly affected by FDI, it is rather affected by other variables 
such as population, education, infrastructure or average income, which can also be 
determinants of foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment in Mexico. Determinants and its effect on income inequality
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Table 6
The effect of FDI on the Gini coefficient 
(single-variable and multi-variable equations)
Notes: The dependent variable is income dispersion between regions, p values in parenthesis; all 
the variables are expressed in logs.
Conclusions
The study shows that FDI in Mexico does not tend to flow to less developed re-
gions or to federal entities where unskilled and cheap labour is more abundant. In 
this respect, there is no support for orthodox theory. On the other hand, FDI tends 
to flow to big markets, in terms of population, and to more developed regions with 
more infrastructure and higher average income. Hence, the determinants of foreign 
direct investment in México are consistent with the economic and geographical 
features or location advantages considered in the eclectic theory or OLI paradigm. 
Educational level is also a determinant of FDI although it is not very robust. This 
result suggests that investment seeks more developed regions with higher concen-
tration of population, which are associated with higher levels of education, but 
education as such is not one of the main determinants of, or is not directly associa-
ted to, FDI inflows. Carmen Guadalupe Juárez Rivera y Gerardo Ángeles Castro 
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Mexico City has the biggest concentration of population and the highest educa-
tional level and GDP per capita in Mexico, not surprisingly it also concentrates 
the largest inflow of FDI; nevertheless, the distance-to-Mexico-City variable is 
not robust in this study. One explanation of this is that between 2001 and 2006 
the percentage of FDI inflow to this region, in relation to the national inflow, fell 
from 76 per cent to 56 per cent.3 In contrast, the inflow of FDI to Nuevo León and 
Jalisco, which are also federal entities with large population and relatively high de-
velopment indicators, increased from 7 per cent to 10 per cent and from 2 per cent 
to 4 per cent respectively, over the same period. Hence, foreign direct investment 
has reduced its concentration in Mexico City and has tended to scatter in other 
potential markets over the last few years. On the other hand, the distance-to-the-
US-border variable is significant. In relation to this, FDI in the 6 northern federal 
entities4 increased from 15 per cent to 28 per cent between 2001 and 2006 (INEGI, 
2011), which indicates that investments in this region tend to consolidate. 
    
With the above in mind, it can be argued that a proportion of FDI in Mexico is 
horizontal because it is aimed at serving the local market, that is, it tends to flow to 
populated areas with high purchasing power. On the other hand, another proportion 
of the investments can be considered vertical, because it locates close to the source 
country, such as the investment that flows to the northern federal entities. It should 
be added that this type of investment can also be attracted by the potential of the 
local market, considering that federal entities in the north have higher average in-
come compared to those in the south. Consequently, FDI inflows in Mexico are di-
verse, tend to deconcentrate from México City, and do not belong to a single type.
In this study, we do not find evidence that foreign direct investment creates in-
equality within regions. In this sense, the variables that explain the distribution of 
income within federal entities are the size of population, the educational level, the 
provision of infrastructure and, to some extent, the geographical location (regions 
in the north tend to be more unequal than those in the south are). 
Foreign direct investment is associated to inequality across federal entities, becau-
se it tends to flow to more developed regions and this result undermines standard 
theory. It is necessary to point that this is so because FDI  locates in regions with 
a better level of development which accentuates regions inequality. However, the 
3The figures are obtained from Distrito Federal and Estado de México, because the city mainly 
extends across the two federal entities.
4Baja California, Sonora Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León y Tamaulipas.Foreign direct investment in Mexico. Determinants and its effect on income inequality
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study shows that determinants of FDI are the main cause of regional inequality and 
it is not the direct effect of the flow of investments as such.
If education and large concentrations of population create inequality within and 
between regions, it is therefore necessary to foster policies that promote a better 
distribution of them across the national territory. According to the results, it is 
also important to promote an even distribution of infrastructure, especially across 
regions, because it has an adverse effect on the distribution of income between 
federal entities. To the extent that these variables can be distributed more evenly, 
the effect of economic growth on income distribution will also become more equa-
litarian.
Finally, we conclude that it is important to achieve a better distribution of the 
determinants of FDI, such as average income, population, infrastructure and, indi-
rectly, education  across federal entities, especially in the less developed regions, 
so that these regions can become more attractive to the flow of investments and 
Mexico can obtain more equalitarian effects from these flows.  
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Appendix 1
GINI coefficient (monetary current income)
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Aguascalientes 0.4887 0.4529 0.4421 0.4327 0.3874 0.4385 0.4887 0.4561
Baja California 0.4891 0.5694 0.3984 0.4133 0.4188 0.3687 0.4475 0.4260
Baja California Sur 0.4313 0.4657 0.4717 0.5610 0.3627 0.3705 0.4233 0.4102
Campeche 0.4663 0.5157 0.5153 0.5288 0.4778 0.4934 0.4854 0.5076
Coahuila de 
Zaragoza
0.5058 0.5208 0.4609 0.4385 0.4144 0.3913 0.4800 0.4485
Colima 0.5058 0.3863 0.3948 0.4612 0.4627 0.4154 0.4085 0.3971
Chiapas 0.5238 0.4208 0.4081 0.5458 0.5517 0.4960 0.4978 0.5364
Chihuahua 0.4418 0.4027 0.4538 0.4503 0.3851 0.4555 0.4546 0.4785
Distrito Federal 0.4597 0.5122 0.4760 0.5054 0.5052 0.4919 0.5078 0.4911
Durango 0.5775 0.4510 0.4272 0.5402 0.4357 0.4548 0.5231 0.4359
Guanajuato 0.4720 0.4341 0.4545 0.4801 0.5744 0.4321 0.4805 0.4851
Guerrero 0.5539 0.5005 0.5682 0.5103 0.5543 0.5098 0.4621 0.4636
Hidalgo 0.4469 0.4448 0.5013 0.5508 0.4830 0.4830 0.5480 0.5051
Jalisco 0.4440 0.4397 0.4574 0.5018 0.3941 0.5193 0.4277 0.4391
Estado de México 0.5207 0.5625 0.4584 0.4950 0.5022 0.4432 0.4419 0.4535
Michoacán de 
Ocampo
0.6385 0.3897 0.4993 0.5335 0.4686 0.3804 0.4286 0.4766
Morelos 0.4524 0.4323 0.4588 0.4807 0.5301 0.4038 0.4286 0.4342
Nayarit 0.4398 0.4199 0.4908 0.4237 0.4487 0.4358 0.4675 0.5574
Nuevo León 0.5769 0.4878 0.4686 0.4870 0.4084 0.4631 0.4569 0.4291
Oaxaca 0.4684 0.5902 0.5357 0.4872 0.5535 0.4808 0.5193 0.5170
Puebla 0.6304 0.4848 0.4544 0.5049 0.4958 0.4966 0.4532 0.4542
Querétaro 0.4494 0.4386 0.4646 0.4509 0.5988 0.4527 0.4778 0.4385
Quintana Roo 0.4030 0.4097 0.4758 0.4216 0.4650 0.3972 0.4571 0.4207
San Luis Potosí 0.4467 0.5599 0.4317 0.5759 0.4165 0.4730 0.4527 0.4957
Sinaloa 0.4846 0.5129 0.6768 0.4602 0.4630 0.4396 0.5309 0.4635
Sonora 0.4603 0.4496 0.4344 0.5121 0.5199 0.4424 0.4431 0.4892
Tabasco 0.5687 0.5359 0.5212 0.4552 0.4836 0.4807 0.5055 0.5085
Tamaulipas 0.4553 0.4497 0.5303 0.6566 0.3951 0.4585 0.4759 0.4643
Tlaxcala 0.4240 0.3608 0.4185 0.4224 0.4181 0.4038 0.6702 0.3589
Veracruz de 
Ignacio de la Llave
0.4901 0.5613 0.4945 0.4822 0.4742 0.4973 0.4777 0.4868
Yucatán 0.4364 0.5344 0.5930 0.4588 0.5566 0.3697 0.4689 0.4826
Zacatecas 0.5276 0.4742 0.4534 0.4747 0.4645 0.4634 0.4400 0.4837
* Ingresos ordenados de acuerdo al ingreso corriente monetario